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Abstract 
 
This study seeks to understand the reasons Singapore attracted far more Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) than Sierra Leone. The choice of these two countries is based on 
their historical similarities. Both Sierra Leone and Singapore were under British rule 
from the nineteenth century to the 1960s. Both countries gained their independence in the 
early 1960s. The countries share the same colonial heritage and therefore gained their 
colonial master’s system of government, legal framework, and economic systems. At 
independence, both countries had similar population size, as well as economies size. 
Sierra Leone’s population was 2.2m and Singapore’s was 1.6m in 1961. Between 1961 
and1965, both countries held similar GDPs and their colonial master (United Kingdom) 
was their major trading partner.   
Using data from the World Bank Doing Business and the World Enterprise 
Survey for Sierra Leone and Singapore, the study finds that Singapore has attracted more 
FDI than Sierra Leone because of the difference in the type of economy. Singapore’s 
economy is more formalized and efficient, whereas Sierra Leone’s economy is informal 
and less efficient. The process of registering a business, obtaining a construction permit, 
buying and registering property, getting credit, paying taxes, trading across borders, and 
enforcing contracts are much more streamlined and formalized in Singapore than in 
Sierra Leone. An informal economy makes it difficult to start and operate a business; and 
it plays a critical role in why some countries attract far less FDI than others. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Many governments in developing countries over the years have made a concerted 
effort to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) because of the capital, technology, and 
the managerial expertise FDI brings to a country and its ability to aid economic growth. 
Sierra Leone has tried but has not been very successful.  
My thesis seeks to understand the reasons Singapore has attracted far more 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) than Sierra Leone since their independence, even though 
both countries are similar in population size and gained their independence about the 
same time. Between 2003 and 2012, Singapore attracted $338 billion in Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), while Sierra Leone attracted only $1.9 billion.1 The main question for 
this thesis is: What are the determinants of FDI in Sierra Leone? Are low levels of FDI 
due to domestic political institutions? Are low levels of FDI due to political instability or 
regime type? Do the business environment and investment risk have an influence on FDI 
in Sierra Leone? Is it the type of economy, the informal economic practice that is 
predominant in most developing countries such as Sierra Leone, which are causing low 
FDI attraction?  Many studies have pointed out that political institution, regime type, 
political instability, autocratic government, military government, and civil wars all lead to 
a risky business environment and therefore make a country less likely to attract FDI.2 Yet 
                                                           
1 World Bank FDI Report 2014: http://data.worldbank.org. 
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many countries in the past (Afghanistan, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Venezuela,) have 
attracted a reasonable amount of FDI in periods of political instability and autocratic 
governments.  Why not Sierra Leone? Foreign investors are aware that they have to 
contend with some level of risk in any part of the world they invest in. However, the 
mostly informal economy that is prevalent in developing countries I believe contributed 
more to the lack of FDI attraction than currently appreciated. Informal economic practice 
refers to economic activities that are not taxed, registered, regulated by the government, 
or included in the Gross National Product (GNP). Most activities in the informal 
economy lack licenses and good bookkeeping. In other words, most businesses in the 
informal sector are not registered and therefore do not pay taxes. The World Bank 
estimated the informal sector represented about 60% to 80% of Sierra Leone’s economy.  
   FDI have contributed enormously to rapid economic growth in many 
developing countries and have also aided in reducing poverty and improving living 
standards in these countries.3 Sierra Leone remains one of the poorest countries in the 
world, maybe because of its inability to attract FDI. Previous studies by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Investment show that inadequate human capital, poor 
infrastructure, and a weak regulatory framework are key factors preventing Sierra Leone 
from attracting FDI.4 But what the study did not explain is why Sierra Leone is able to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Glen Biglaiser and Joseph L. Staats, “Do Political Institutions Affect Foreign 
Direct Investment?” Political Research Quarterly 63, no. 3 (2010): 508-522. 
 
3 E. Borensztein, J. De Gregorio, and J. W. Lee, “How Does Foreign Direct 
Investment Affect Economic Growth?, ” Journal of International Economics 45, no. 1 
(1998). 
 
4 UNCTAD, Investment Policy Review: Sierra Leone (New York: United Nations, 
2010). 
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attract a reasonable amount of FDI in the extractive industry but not in the other sectors 
of the economy.  My study will go a step further by trying to identify and explain why 
other sectors of the economy fail to attract noteworthy FDI. 
The significance of the study, I hope, might add new insight that may assist the 
government of Sierra Leone to formulate policies that will attract FDI to all sectors of the 
economy. Additionally, the findings hopefully will assist the government of Sierra Leone 
and other countries similar to Sierra Leone in their ongoing attempt to diversify their 
economies from their heavy dependence on extractive minerals. 
 
Benefits of FDI 
Foreign Direct Investment has been defined as an investment made by a company 
based in one country into a company based in another country. Foreign Direct 
Investment, which is the subject of this paper, differs substantially from indirect 
investment such as portfolio investment, wherein overseas institutions invest in equities 
listed on a nation’s stock market. FDI is often carried by Multinational Corporations 
(MNCs) in the form of acquisition of state-owned enterprises, joint ventures, and starting 
new businesses in the host country.  
FDI, through MNCs, have been beneficial to developing countries in various 
ways. FDI are seen to be instrumental in transfer of capital, technology, managerial 
knowledge, and other resources to developing countries.5  An increase in FDI through 
MNC has been associated with improved economic growth due to increased tax revenues 
                                                           
5 Prakash Loungani and Assaf Razin, “How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct 
Investment for Developing Countries?,” Finance and Development 38, no. 2 (2001): 6-9. 
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resulting from increased economic activities for the host country.   If MNCs invest in a 
country, the host country’s citizens benefit from increased local employment 
opportunities and access to technology and skills, thereby putting income in the hands of 
the local people, which improve their standard of living. 
In addition to employment opportunities, the host country will benefit in having 
access to modern workers training programs and managerial best practice processes. 
MNCs often bring talented managers experienced in organizing efficient production 
process that are often not available in developing countries. The transfer of knowledge 
through training of local managers helps develop the skills of the local citizens. This 
enabling the local citizens to participate in the global economic activities and as a result 
attracts more FDI because of the presence of skilled workers. 
FDI is also beneficial to the host country as it opens up access to foreign markets 
and extensive marketing network for the host country’s products and services. Access to 
new markets will promote export, increase economic activities, promote economic 
development, and hence the standard of living of the citizens of the host country.   
Furthermore, Foreign Direct Investment can result in the transfer of technical 
skills to the host country through training in more advance technology used by 
Multinational Corporation.6 Additionally, the availability of this more advanced 
technology in the host country will give them access to current research and development 
project that is needed to develop the local infrastructure and other capacity building 
                                                           
6 Bruno Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie and Frank Lichtenberg, “Does Foreign 
Direct Investment Transfer Technology across Borders?,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 83, no. 3 (2001): 490-497. 
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needed to make the country more attractive to foreign investors.7  The presence of foreign 
companies is said to have positive impact on productivity of the domestic economy. That 
is, competition from the foreign companies can lead to higher productivity gains and 
greater efficiency in the host country. It has also been suggested that the presence of 
Multinational Corporation may improve corporate governance standards for domestic 
companies in developing countries. 
However, there have been some arguments against FDI because of the political 
power and environmental impact that some MNCs have exerted on the domestic 
economy. Among the concerns are the overconsumptions of water by large-scale 
commercial projects; the depletion of natural resources; and the abuse of workers in 
developing countries with weak labor laws. Most concerning are the large-scale 
environment impact that is left behind by multinational corporations in poor countries 
with weak and unenforceable environment laws. Such practices tend to be prevalent in 
the mining and manufacturing industries where large-scale machinery and land spaces are 
required.   Many do believe, however, that with strong environment laws and corporate 
citizenships, these problems can be resolved.  
Despite these concerns, the general consensus is that FDI have had a positive 
effect in promoting economic development and raising living standards in developing 
countries. 
 
 
                                                           
7 Jože P. Damijan et al., “The Role of Fdi, R&D Accumulation and Trade in 
Transferring Technology to Transition Countries: Evidence from Firm Panel Data for 
Eight Transition Countries,” Economic systems 27, no. 2 (2003): 189-204. 
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Case Selection: Why Singapore and Sierra Leone? 
On the surface, Sierra Leone and Singapore are viewed as two different countries 
in two different geographical locations with vast differences in terms of economic 
development and wealth, which is true. However, this study is not about a most different 
case study, but rather a most similar case study, because Singapore and Sierra Leone are 
similar countries at their inception but evolved to completely different countries 50 years 
later.  
Selection of these two countries is not a random choice but instead a deliberate 
choice, one that is based on the historical similarities of both countries at the beginning of 
their history, but each took a different path to arrive at their economic status today. The 
choice of these two countries is designed to build theories of success and failures in 
attracting FDI and economic development in two similar countries at their inception. The 
choice also contributes to the politics of strategic decision-making process and the 
political economy of FDI.  
Both Sierra Leone and Singapore were under British rule from the nineteenth 
century to the 1960s. Sierra Leone was colonized by Britain from 1808 to 1961, while 
Singapore was under British rule from 1824 to 1965. Both countries gained their 
independence - Sierra Leone on April 27, 1961 and Singapore in August 1965. The 
countries share the same colonial heritage and inherited their colonial master’s system of 
government, legal framework, and economic systems. At independence, both countries 
had similar population size and the sizes of their economies were also similar. Sierra 
Leone’s population was 2.2m and Singapore’s was 1.6m in 1961. As Table 1 below 
indicated, between 1961 and1965, both countries held similar GDPs and their colonial 
7 
 
master (United Kingdom) was their major trading partner, but by 1980, Singapore’s GDP 
was twelve times that of Sierra Leone’s.  
 
Table 1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in US $ 
Year Singapore Sierra Leone 
1961                   764,303,121                    327,834,680  
1962                   825,879,878                    342,721,579  
1963                   917,216,012                    348,546,951  
1964                   893,728,644                    371,848,114  
1965                   974,186,762                    359,379,856  
1980              12,078,880,713                 1,100,685,845  
1990              38,899,863,982                    649,644,827  
2000              95,835,971,175                    635,874,002  
2012            289,941,106,344                 3,789,119,779  
Source: World Bank (WDI) 
  
Both Sierra Leone and Singapore over the years have reformed their investment 
policies to attract FDI. For example, the Sierra Leone 1988 Port Authority Act was not 
only aimed at privatizing the airport and Maritime industry for effective management but 
was also put in place to encourage foreign investors to invest in the transportation 
industry of the country. Since 1988 various investment promotion Acts have been 
adopted to liberalize the economy and to provide incentives for investments in Sierra 
Leone. Most importantly, in 2004, with the support of the World Bank Foreign 
Investment Advisory Services (FIAS) and the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development (DFID), the government of Sierra Leone enacted the 
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Investment Promotion Act of 2004. This Act created an agency whose sole responsibility 
is the promotion of FDI into the country. The objective of this agency, the Sierra Leone 
Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA), is to promote investment and 
provide business facilitation services to foreign investors. SLIEPA provides personalized 
services and investment environment information such as taxation, business registration, 
and various incentives to potential investors to Sierra Leone.    
Likewise, Singapore’s investment policies to attract FDI have grown over time 
since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1965.  Various Acts can be attributed 
to the development of the early investment policies in Singapore; among them is the 1967 
Economic Expansion Act.  The attraction of FDI was made paramount when in 1983, the 
Singapore Trade Development Board (TDB) was established to be the main wing to 
promote Singapore’s investment environment to the international community and to 
attract corporations to base in Singapore. The TDB over the years has actively negotiated 
free trade agreements with various countries.  
Both countries are members of the World Trade organization, and both have 
signed several Bilateral Investment Treaties (BIT) with various countries. Sierra Leone 
over the years has incorporated into its FDI strategy international best practice 
recommended by the World Bank and the IMF, yet still has not attracted that much FDI.  
The difference is that along the way Singapore was able to formalize its economy 
while Sierra Leone’s economy is still mostly an informal economy.  
 
Background 
Sierra Leone, a former British colony, is located on the west coast of Africa. Its 
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colonial history can be traced to 1787 when a group of British individuals acquired a 
piece of land in the western part of the country to be used as a settlement for freed slaves 
(Freetown) from England, Nova Scotia, and the West Indies.  In 1808, Freetown became 
a Crown Colony of the British government. In 1896, the other part of the country became 
a British protectorate and added to the colony making the rest of the country under 
British rule. 
After over 150 years of British rule, Sierra Leone gained independence from 
Britain on April 27, 1961. Though dominated by the two largest groups, the Mendes and 
the Temnes, the country is made up of eighteen ethnic groups. The estimated population 
of the country is about 5.6 million (2008 census). Sierra Leone is blessed with rich 
mineral resources including iron ore, gold, bauxite, rutile, and diamonds.8 
Sierra Leone gained independence within a period of intense global alignment and 
strategic alliance.  At first Sierra Leone, like so many former colonies, saw FDI as a form 
of neo-colonization. The suspicion has credence because most FDI was coming from the 
former colonial master. To protect their infant industries, many developing countries 
erected legal and other financial barriers against FDI and turned to Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI).  For example, in the late 1970s, the Sierra Leone Produce 
Marketing Board (SLPMB) was commissioned to coordinate agricultural produce; its 
primary aim was to make the country self-sufficient in food supply and less dependent on 
imported food. SLPMB was also responsible in helping farmers transform their 
production process from subsistence farming to a more mechanized production process, 
and it serves as a link between the farmers and the export market. The aim was to protect 
Sierra Leone’s agricultural industry, which happens to be the largest employer even 
                                                           
8 Sierra Leone 2011 EITI Report: Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI). 
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today.  These protectionist policies employed by developing countries for over 20 years 
slowed economic development because of the lack of capital needed to build roads and 
infrastructures that will support and foster economic growth.  
But in the 1980s the forces of globalization and economic global integration were 
too great to be ignored by any country. Therefore, developing countries began to open up 
their economies to join the global economy. Unable to obtain loans to fund economic 
development because of the strict conditionality imposed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank and other lenders, developing countries turned to FDI, 
something they avoided earlier on.  
As developing countries were showing interest in FDI in the 1980s, foreign 
investors were looking for investment opportunities. From 1980 to the present, FDI has 
grown significantly and has been a major part of economic development in developing 
countries. According to the World Investment Report, FDI has grown from $20 billion in 
1980 to $22.8 trillion in 2012.9  Yet with this large flow of FDI to developing countries, 
Sierra Leone has not attracted that much foreign investment. The question is: Why has 
Sierra Leone failed to attract more FDI?  
  
                                                           
9 UNCTAD. “World Investment Report, 2013.” (New York: United Nations), 
2013. 
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           Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
Research reflects many causes for FDI attraction, but the literature on the political 
economy of FDI points to various political reasons why a country may not attract FDI.  
 
The Political Economy of FDI 
The most important scholarly literature on FDI began in the 1970s when the 
seizure of foreign investment by host governments grew rapidly.  According to David A. 
Jodice, there were eight expropriations in twenty-five countries in 1975.10   This seizure 
of foreign investment created tension between foreign investors and host governments 
and it was affecting FDI flows into developing countries.  This tension formed the 
paradigm for research on the political economy of FDI in the 1970s. Raymond Vernon 
suggests that the tension was due to a bargaining problem between host countries and 
foreign investors.11  This was especially true in the mining industry wherein after the 
initial heavy capital intensive investment by the foreign investor, the bargaining power 
shifted to the host government who can seize the entire plant.12 
However, in the 1990s, developing countries began to realize the economic 
                                                           
 
10 David A. Jodice, “Sources of Change in Third World Regimes for Foreign 
Direct Investment. 1968-1976,” International Organization 34, no. 2 (1980): 177-206. 
  
11 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay (New York: Basic Books, 1971). 
 
12 Stephen J. Kobrin, “Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing 
Sector in Developing Countries,” International Organization 41, no. 4 (1987): 609-638. 
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benefits of FDI and began to make efforts in attracting foreign investors by opening their 
markets and doing everything possible to spark an interest. Instead of focusing on profit 
maximization (bargaining power), developing countries now focus on maximizing 
economic growth by attracting FDI inflows to their country. The literature on the past 20 
years focuses on political determinants of FDI to developing countries. One prominent 
finding by Quan Li and Adam Resnick reveal that democratic governments find it easier 
to attract foreign investors than non-democratic governments because they have stronger 
and better enforceable property rights protections laws.13  In addition, Nathan M. Jensen 
concludes that foreign investors generally trust the commitment received from 
democratic governments.14 The argument is a sensible one as the security of FDI is 
paramount to foreign investors.  The argument for democratic governments to be able to 
attract more FDI is based on the fact that democratic regimes are deemed to be stable in 
nature. Firstly, this stability is because politics and policies are conducted in an open and 
transparent environment. Secondly, as a result of political participation and the ability of 
people in democracies to vote leaders out of offices, democratic leaders think twice 
before engaging in seizing foreign investors’ assets. Finally, with today’s twenty-four 
hour news cycle, the negative international reactions of a democratic government seizing 
foreign investors’ assets will turn off other foreign investors.    
                                                           
 
13 Quan Li and Adam Resnick, “Reversal of Fortunes: Democracy, Property 
Rights and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries,” International 
Organization 57, no. 1 (2003): 175-211. 
  
14 Nathan M. Jensen, “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: 
Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment,” International 
Organization 57, no. 3 (2003): 587-616. 
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On the other hand, although the literature agrees that there is a link between 
investment risk and political regime, others argue that autocratic governments are better 
hosts of FDI than democratic governments. John Tuman and Craig F. Emmert argue that 
policy instability is greater under democratic regimes than autocratic regimes.15 This is so 
because in a democracy, there is a change of party every now and then and there is a lot 
of policy adjustment during and after elections. The frequent changes of politicians and 
parties in democratic governments, they point out, lead to policy instability and therefore 
undermine foreign investors’ confidence in a host country.  In fact, John R. Oneal argues 
that some investors have an affinity for autocratic regimes.16 
When it comes to FDI, there seems to be no consensus on the literature as to 
whether democratic governments provide a less risky investment environment for 
investors or autocratic governments are a riskier place to invest.  In fact, some of the 
literature argues that regime types (democratic or autocratic) make little difference when 
it comes to where FDI flows.  Glen Biglaiser and Karl DeRouen Jr. state that FDI will go 
where it is profitable regardless of regime type.17  
The FDI literature discussed above, points to the investment risk that is 
inextricably linked to the political instability perpetuated by different political regimes. 
Foreign investors are aware that they have to contend with some level of risk in any part 
                                                           
15 John Tuman and Craig F. Emmert, “The Political Economy of U.S. Foreign 
Direct Investment in Latin America: A Reappraisal,” Latin America Research Review 39, 
no. 3 (2004): 9-28. 
    
16 John R. Oneal, “The Affinity of Foreign Investors for Authoritarian Regimes,” 
Political Research Quarterly 47, no. 3 (1994): 565-588. 
  
17 Glen Biglaiser and Karl DeRouen, Jr., “Economic Reforms and Inflows of 
Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America,” Latin America Research Review 41, no. 1 
(2006): 51-75.  
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of the world they invest in. What has not been looked at deeply, however, is how the type 
of economy affects FDI attraction. The mostly informal economy that is prevalent in 
developing countries I believe contributed more to the lack of FDI attraction than 
currently appreciated.  
 
Hypothesis 
My hypothesis is that the informal economy, which makes it difficult to start and 
operate a business in the country, played a critical role in Sierra Leone’s attracting far 
less FDI than Singapore. This is so because most investors want to see a transparent and 
efficient business environment before deciding to do business in a country. 
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Chapter 3 
Doing Business in Singapore and Sierra Leone 
 
To compare the ease at which companies and investors can start and operate a 
business in Sierra Leone and Singapore, I use the World Bank Doing Business data.  
Each year since 2003, the World Bank Doing Business Project has been gathering and 
analyzing comprehensive quantitative data about the business environment of 189 
countries. The annual report presents quantitative indicators on 10 areas of business 
regulation for 189 countries. The 10 areas included are starting a business, dealing with 
construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and resolving 
insolvency. These areas cover the most important elements of the life of a business and 
foreign investors consider them as they decide the country in which to invest.  Starting a 
business, dealing with construction permit, buying and registering property, getting 
credit, paying taxes, trading across borders, and enforcing contracts  are the factors most 
often associated as having the greatest constraint for investors.  
 
Starting a Business in Singapore and Sierra Leone 
One of the first things to start and operate a business in any part of the world is to 
legally register the business. This process includes obtaining all necessary licenses and 
permits needed for the business to be considered legally registered. The evaluation also 
includes the cost and time it takes to complete the registration process. This is the first 
16 
 
stage in which investors are introduced to the realities of the business environment of a 
country.   
 
 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 1A and 1B, in 2008, it takes 8 procedures and 26 days to 
register a business in Sierra Leone.  While in Singapore, in 2008, it takes 5 procedures 
and 5 days to register a business. In 2013, it takes 6 procedures and 12 days to start a 
business in Sierra Leone, while in Singapore, in 2013, it takes 3 procedures and 2.5 days 
to register a business. The ease of registering a business in a country is very important 
17 
 
because it is an indicator of an efficient business environment, and investors will surely 
think twice about investing in a country in which the process is long and cumbersome as 
it is in Sierra Leone. 
 
Obtaining a Construction Permit in Singapore and Sierra Leone 
Most businesses need an office building, warehouse, and other real estate property 
to conduct their business. Obtaining a construction permit is a pre-requisite to construct 
these business facilities. The faster the processes the better, especially for businesses that 
may want to expand their operation to gain more market share. The ease of obtaining a 
construction permit is a business advantage and enhances its smooth running. However, 
this is not the case in Sierra Leone compared to Singapore. As shown in Figures 2A to 
2C, in 2008, there were 40 procedures and it took an average of 206 days to obtain a 
construction permit in Sierra Leone. At the end it cost 13.5% of the value of the 
warehouse. On the other hand, in Singapore, it took 10 procedures, 60 days and cost 0.3% 
to obtain a construction permit.  
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In Sierra Leone there was improvement in the number of days, procedures, and 
cost it took to acquire a construction permit. Between 2008 and 2013, the number of 
procedures reduces from 40 to 16, the number of days from 206 to 166, and warehouse 
cost from 13.5% to 6.5%. However, much improvement is still needed in Sierra Leone 
because the time it takes to obtain a construction permit is still too long and anti-
competitive in Sierra Leone, and therefore businesses are at a disadvantage compared to 
those in Singapore, especially if those businesses desire to expand. In today’s fast pace 
global economy, 206 or even 166 days are just too many days to wait to obtain a 
construction permit.  
 
Buying and Registering Property in Singapore and Sierra Leone 
If a business decides not to build a warehouse or a property and instead decides to 
buy, it takes even longer and cost more to purchase land or building in Sierra Leone than 
obtaining a construction permit. The complete process for a business to buy a property 
from another business until the title is transferred takes 8 procedures, 235 days, and cost 
14.9% of the value of the property in 2008. In Singapore the same process takes 4 
procedures, 20 days and 2.8% of the value of the property. In 2013, it takes 7 procedures, 
67 days and 11.6% of the value of the property in Sierra Leone, while it takes 4 
procedures, 19 days and 2.8% of the value of the property in Singapore. See Figures 3A 
through 3C below. 
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Getting Credit and Finance in Singapore and Sierra Leone 
One of the most important blood lines for a smooth functioning economy is the 
ability of its businesses to have access to credit and financing when needed. Cash flow 
collections for most businesses fluctuate and some businesses are seasonal. To maintain 
the day-to-day operation of a business such as paying salaries and meeting other 
expenses, businesses must be able to access credit and financing easily. But for banks and 
other financial institutions to have the courage to extend credit to individuals and 
businesses, they should be able to determine the credit worthiness of those seeking credit 
and financing. This determination is normally done through credit information provided 
by credit bureau.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are no credit bureaus in Sierra Leone, therefore credit information and the 
credit coverage for businesses and individuals is zero. In Singapore there are credit 
bureaus and the credit coverage for a business or individual is 43% in 2008 and 58% in 
2013. The nonexistence of the credit bureau in Sierra Leone makes extending credit very 
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difficult, and lenders will have to depend on an informal system in which to extend 
credit. See Figure 4B above. 
 
Paying Taxes in Singapore and Sierra Leone 
Every business is expected to pay taxes, but the number of times in a given year 
that a business has to pay taxes and the administrative burden of paying the taxes affect 
how investors decide where to invest. In 2008, there are 29 number of payments required 
in Sierra Leone, and it takes 339 hours to complete. In 2013, there are 33 number of 
payments required in Sierra Leone, and it takes 357 hours to complete. While in 
Singapore, there are 5 payments required in 2008, and it averages about 49 hours. In 
2013, there are 5 payments required in Singapore, and it takes about 82 hours. See 
Figures 5A and 5B below. 
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The number of the tax payments per year includes the frequency of filings that are 
required to the different government agencies. Taxes such as sales taxes, payroll taxes 
and social contribution taxes are included in the measure. The hours needed to complete 
includes the time it takes to collect information and prepare the taxes. The frequency of 
payments in the filing schedule, and the number of hours and amount of information 
required is extraneous and will surely discourage businesses in Sierra Leone because it 
will eat into their profit. 
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Trading Across Borders – Singapore and Sierra Leone 
While operating in a global economy, most businesses aspire to export their 
products in order to expand business and to find new markets. The questions many 
investors ask include: How much time is needed and what is the process to export a 
product out of a country? Answers to these are important because the time, number of 
procedures, and the cost of export affect business profit and business relations with 
overseas business customers and partners. In fact, in their article Trading on Time, 
Simeon Djankov and Pham, argued that the time it takes to complete an export affect 
international trade.18 In a study of 98 countries’ exporting process, they found that each 
additional day a product is delayed reduces trade by more than one percent. In other 
words the longer it takes to complete the exporting process, the less likely a country will 
attract investors. The 31 days that is needed in Sierra Leone compared to the 6 days in 
Singapore, is a clear indication why Singapore is more attractive to investors than Sierra 
Leone.  
 
 
                                                           
18 S. Djankov, C. L. Freund, and C. S. Pham, 2006. “Trading on Time,” World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper (3909). 
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As shown in Figures 6A and 6B, in Sierra Leone it takes about 7 documents and 
31 days in 2008 to complete an export process for a 20-foot container. In 2013, it takes 
about the 7 documents and 24 days to complete an export process. This time does not 
include the length of days the cargo is on the sea. In Singapore on the other hand, it takes 
3 documents and about 6 days in both 2008 and 2013 to complete an export process.  
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Enforcing Contracts in Singapore and Sierra Leone 
Most often both local and international businesses deal in contracts.  Most 
business transactions are governed by commercial contracts. There are contracts to 
perform a service, to deliver a product, buy on credit, repair an office space, etc. If a 
contract is breached, how long will it take to resolve it, how many procedures does it 
take, and how much does it cost are questions most business owners and investors ask as 
they engage in business. In other words, is the judicial system in a country good enough 
to efficiently resolve commercial dispute and in a timely manner. In Sierra Leone, the 
main court that has the jurisdiction to resolve commercial dispute is the Freetown High 
Court – Commercial Section and in Singapore it is the Singapore District Court – 
Subordinate Court.  
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As shown in Figures 7A and 7B, in 2008, it takes an average of 515 days and 40 
procedures for the Freetown High court to complete the enforcement of a contract that is 
in dispute in Sierra Leone. In 2013, it takes 515 days and 39 procedures to complete the 
process of enforcing a contract in Sierra Leone. While it takes about 120 days and 21 
procedures for the Singapore District Court to complete an enforcement process in 2008, 
and 150 days and 21 procedures in 2013. 
It is generally agreed in business that the ability to enforce a contract is essential 
for the business to operate smoothly. It encourages business-to-business transaction and 
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business-to-individual transaction, and also encourages trade and investment in an 
economy.  
 
World Bank Business Environment Survey in Sierra Leone 
Every three to four years, the World Bank conducts an Enterprise survey to assess 
the business and investing environment of each country. The survey covers 135 countries. 
The most current and comprehensive survey available for Sierra Leone conducted by the 
World Bank was done in 2009.19 In the survey, a total of 150 companies were randomly 
selected in Sierra Leone.   
These questionnaires by Enterprise Surveys cover a wide range of business 
environment topics including access to investment opportunities, access to finance, 
corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, annual sales, workforce composition, cost 
of labor, bribery, land and permits, capacity utilization, business-government relations, 
taxation, informality, and other variables. Each survey is conducted via face-to-face 
interview with top managers and business owners in each country. The Enterprise Survey 
in Sierra Leone was conducted during the period September 15, 2008 to February 13, 
2009. A high response rate was reported because the survey was conducted during a 
period in which an abundance of statistical data was collected by the government of 
Sierra Leone and the international community. This maybe as a result of the government 
and the international community embarking on a reconstruction effort after the civil war 
ended in 2002. 
                                                           
19 Enterprise Surveys (http:/www.enterprisesurveys.org), World Bank. 
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The surveys used standardized survey instruments and a uniform sampling 
methodology to provide data that are comparable across countries. The sampling 
methodology of the Enterprise Surveys generates sample sizes that are appropriate for 
the size of each country’s economy. Usually up to 1,800 interviews are conducted for 
large economies; up to 360 for medium-sized economies; and up to 150 interviews for 
small economies like Sierra Leone. The main aim of the standardized survey 
questionnaire created by the Enterprise Survey is to determine how the business 
environment impacts and cause constraints on investments in a particular country and to 
compare the investment climate of individual countries across the world.  
According to the survey, in Sierra Leone, the top 10 factors that have the greatest 
negative impact on the business environment are tax rate, access to finance, electricity, 
informal sector, corruption, access to land, transportation, political instability, labor 
regulation, and customs and trade regulation. See Figure A below. 
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As shown in Figure A, political instability is ranked as the 8th factor that business 
owners consider important. Instead, it is the business environment factors of starting and 
operating a business that investors consider the top seven constraining factors.   
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Leone
31 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Discussion 
 
Data collected from the World Bank Doing Business, which analyze the business 
environments of 189 countries, reveal that the following 10 areas of quantitative 
indicators of business regulation either hinder or attract FDI into a country. The 10 are 
starting a business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering 
property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, 
enforcing contracts, and resolving insolvency. From this ten, the following seven have 
often been shown to be the greatest constraint for investors in economics that are 
predominately informal: starting a business, dealing with construction permit, buying and 
registering property, getting credit, paying taxes, trading across borders, and enforcing 
contracts.  
The data show that starting a business in Singapore takes less time, less 
paperwork, and is more cost effective. In 2008, it took 5 procedures and 5 days to register 
a business, and in 2013, it took 3 procedures and 2.5 days. While in Sierra Leone, it took 
8 procedures and 26 days to register a business, and in 2013 it took 6 procedures and 12 
days. Even though the data showed that Sierra Leone has made improvements in recent 
years in the business registration process as noted in the reduction of procedures and days 
required to registering a business, there is still room for improvement in the business 
registration process. For example, there could be fewer steps required to register a 
business, this would reduce duplication and improve transparency. The longer it takes to 
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register a business, the more likely that corruption and bribery will take place. Most 
Multinational Corporation such as those in the USA are not allowed to bribe government 
officials because of the Foreign Corrupt Act. The US foreign Corrupt Act prohibits USA 
companies official from bribing foreign officials to gain favorable business deal,20 as a 
result Multinational Corporation will find themselves at disadvantage and will likely be 
hesitant to invest or increase investment in Sierra Leone if the process of registering a 
business continues to be a lengthy one. In fact the length of time it takes to register a 
business can be considered barrier to entry in a country’s market.  
Obtaining a construction permit is paramount in business expansion, and in Sierra 
Leone the data indicate long waiting periods and high cost, in comparison to Singapore. 
In 2008, there were 40 procedures and an average of 206 days with an end cost of 13.5% 
of the value of the warehouse, in order to obtain a construction permit in Sierra Leone. In 
Singapore it took 10 procedures, 60 days and a cost of 0.3% to obtain a construction 
permit. Although there was an improvement in the number of procedures reducing from 
40 to 16, the days from 206 to 166, and warehouse cost from 13.5% to 6.5%, Sierra 
Leone still lagged behind in formalizing and streamlining the process of obtaining a 
construction permit. In dealing with construction permits, speed matters because a 
company may need to expand its business quickly may be due to having acquired new 
business clients. Therefore, they will need new office space and warehousing space to 
conduct their operations. A company that needs to expand within three months will be at 
a great disadvantage in Sierra Leone where in it takes 206 days to obtain a construction 
                                                           
20 Jack G. Kaikati et al., “The Price of International Business Morality: Twenty 
Years under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” Journal of Business Ethics 26, no. 3 
(2000): 213-222. 
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permit. Additionally, studies have shown that countries that have streamlined the process 
of obtaining a permit and making it easier to obtain a permit also tend to be more 
transparent and increase government revenue.21  The more a transparent a business 
process is, the more likely that foreign investors will be attracted to that country.  The 
importance of obtaining a construction permit easily was highlighted by a study 
conducted in 19 Asia-Pacific countries. A survey of 218 companies in that region 
indicated that the procedures and the time it takes to obtaining a construction permit is to 
them one of the greatest obstacles to doing business in those countries.22 The study also 
highlights that obtaining a construction permit is a critical factor when companies decide 
on the country in which to establish their business. 
Buying and registering property in which foreign companies can operate their 
business in Sierra Leone proved to be just as tedious and costly as obtaining the 
construction permit. In 2008 the transfer of title from property owner to business took 8 
procedures, 235 days, and cost 14.9% of the value of the property; and 7 procedures, 67 
days, and 11.6% of the value of the property in 2013. Whereas, in Singapore, in 2008 it 
took 4 procedures, 20 days and 2.8% of the value of the property; and 4 procedures, 19 
days and 2.8% of the value of the property in 2013.  Related to obtaining a construction 
permit, buying and registering property in Sierra Leone takes three times longer in Sierra 
Leone than in Singapore. This lengthy time period it takes to register a property affect 
                                                           
21Aleksandra Kaźmierczak, “Economic Impact of Accelerating Permit Processes 
on Local Development and Government Revenues.” Report Prepared for the American 
Institute of Architects, Washington, Dc. Pricewaterhousecoopers, 2005. 
  
22 Singapore Business Federation, “Key Findings from Abac ‘Ease of Doing 
Business’(Eodb) Survey,” Presentation at Singapore Business Federation dialogue 
session “Removing Barriers for Business Growth in APEC,” Singapore, July 9 (2009). 
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companies that need to expand their operations quickly.  Since business operations, 
customer needs, and client needs can change at any time, companies are looking for a 
flexible and efficient business environment in which they can make decisions and 
implement them quickly without hindrance due to government regulations. 
Getting credit and securing adequate finance to ensure the smooth operation of a 
business is vital to any new business looking to be established in a region or area in 
which it believes it can be profitable. However, the World Bank Doing Business data 
indicate that there are no credit bureaus existing in Sierra Leone as of 2013, thereby 
making it difficult for businesses and individuals to secure credit coverage. In Singapore 
there are credit bureaus and the credit coverage for a business or individual is 43% in 
2008 and 58% in 2013. The none existence of credit bureaus in Sierra Leone cause 
investors to be dependent on the informal sector in raising capital. However, the informal 
process of raising capital through family members and friends is not an efficient and 
reliable way of financing business transactions for Multination Corporation. This lack of 
a formal way of raising capital locally hinders foreign investors to invest in Sierra Leone. 
Access to adequate and reliable credit is critical, even to foreign companies. Although  
foreign companies can access the international market to raise capital, day-to-day and 
short-time financing of business transaction such as payroll, are normally financed 
through short-term credit line from the local capital market. 
Taxation payments, another business regulation that can either hinder or attract 
FDI into a country, is shown in the data to be burdensome for Sierra Leone’s investors. In 
2008, 29 number of payments were required in Sierra Leone, which took 339 hours to 
complete; and in 2013, 33 number of payments were required and it took 357 hours to 
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complete. Singapore, on the other hand, required only 5 payments in 2008, which 
averaged about 49 hours; and in 2013, 5 payments were required averaging about 82 
hours. 
Exportation, to foster trading across borders, was another clear indication of why 
Singapore attracted more investors than Sierra Leone. In 2008, to complete an export 
process for a 20-foot container, it took 7 documents and 31 days; and in 2013, 7 
documents and 24 days. However, the investor in Singapore needed to process 3 
documents and about 6 days in which to complete an export process in both 2008 and 
2013.  
Enforcing contracts is essential for businesses transaction because it not only 
protect investors and shareholders; it also encourages trade and investment among 
business and with individuals. However, a broken contract means loss of money and 
sometimes products. Investors are set at ease if they know that disputes can be efficiently 
settled in a well-functioning judicial system if a contract is breached.  The World Bank 
Doing Business data indicates that, in 2008, an average of 515 days and 40 procedures is 
what it took the Freetown High Court in Sierra Leone to complete the enforcement of a 
contract dispute; and in 2013, disputes were settled in an average of 515 days with 39 
procedures. In the Singapore District Court, however, it took about 120 days and 21 
procedures in 2008, and 150 days and 21 procedures in 2013 to complete an enforcement 
process in Singapore. The time it takes to settle contractual dispute is too long and needs 
to be addressed in Sierra Leone so that investors and shareholders can feel protected. If it 
takes 515 days to resolve a business contract dispute, most investors will be hesitant to 
invest in Sierra Leone because the longer the time, the more likely that corruption will 
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take place. Protecting investors is important because it allows companies to raise more 
capital that is needed to grow the business from foreign investors. If investors do not feel 
protected, companies in foreign countries have limited means to raise capital. The long-
held view is a stronger legal system that protects investors makes investors more 
confident about their investments.23 Studies have shown that countries with stronger 
investor protections laws tend to attract more foreign investors and companies into their 
countries, and they tend to grow faster with higher profit.24  Enforcing contract is also 
important when it comes to debt contracts. Access to debt is very important and debt 
contracts are very important as they enable companies to borrow from financial 
institutions to finance their operations and companies in turn are able to extend credit to 
their customers. Therefore, the contract enforcement mechanism should be good enough 
to allow lenders to go after defaulting borrowers in swift and efficient manner especially 
for companies with creditors. If there is an efficient debt and contract enforcement, 
foreign investors will most likely be attracted to invest in a country.      
The World Bank also conducts an Enterprise survey to assess the business and 
investing environment of various countries, and the most recent survey covers 135 
countries.  Comprehensive surveys are available for Sierra Leone, and the most current 
conducted by the World Bank was done in 2009.   
                                                           
23 Jay Dahya, Orlin Dimitrov, and John J. McConnell, “Dominant Shareholders, 
Corporate Boards, and Corporate Value: A Cross-Country Analysis,” Journal of 
Financial Economics 87, no. 1 (2008): 73-100. 
 
24 R. David McLean, Tianyu Zhang, and Mengxin Zhao, “Why Does the Law 
Matter? Investor Protection and Its Effects on Investment, Finance, and Growth,” Journal 
of Finance 67, no. 1 (2012): 313-350. 
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Using standardized survey instruments and uniformed sampling methodology, up 
to 150 interviews for small economies like Sierra Leone were conducted.  These 
standardized survey questionnaires and interviews, created by the Enterprise Survey, 
determine how the business environment impacts and cause constraints on investments in 
a particular country. The survey also compares and contrasts the investment climate of 
individual countries across the world.  
According to the survey, in Sierra Leone, the top 10 factors that have the greatest 
negative impact on the business environment are tax rate, access to finance, electricity, 
informal sector, corruption, access to land, transportation, political instability, labor 
regulation, and customs and trade regulation. These factors are important determinants of 
FDI attraction, and they greatly affect the local business environment. 
 
Alternative Explanation 
The main argument in this thesis is that Singapore has attracted more FDI than 
Sierra Leone because of the difference in the type of economy. Singapore’s economy is 
more formalized and efficient, whereas Sierra Leone’s economy is informal and less 
efficient. I am aware others may argue that the difference in Sierra Leone is more than 
the type of economy. Factors such as geographical locations, culture, people, natural 
resources, and rich neighbors have been put forward in arguing the comparison of one 
country being more successful than the other.     
These factors may contribute to the success of some nations; however, success 
cannot be attributed to any one factor alone independent of all others.  
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For example, in the books Guns, Germs, and Steel25 and The Wealth and Poverty 
of Nations,
26, authors Jared Diamond and Harvard economist David S. Landes, 
respectively, argue that it takes multiple factors depending on each other to bring about 
the economic success of a nation. That is, a country’s physical factors such as its 
infrastructure, geographical location, culture, people, and natural resources may be great 
and may even be considered advantageous in relation to other countries.  However, these 
factors by themselves do not make a successful economy. For example, a country is not 
successful based on the fact that it has iron ore, or that it is located in the tropics or 
subtropics, or that it has a rich cultural history, or has access to the sea. Instead, a 
country’s success is largely dependent on how its government harmoniously develops 
these factors to create an efficient working economy.  
Others may argue that having rich neighboring countries may influence FDI 
attraction. However, both Singapore and Sierra Leone FDI are not significantly 
influenced by neighboring countries.  Singapore receives about half of its FDI from Asian 
countries and the rest from Europe, North America, Oceania, South and Central America, 
and Africa. See Table 1 in the Appendix.  Likewise Sierra Leone receives most of its FDI 
from Europe, the United States, China, and some from neighboring countries.  
Many factors may enhance a country’s ability to attract FDI. However, the 
improvements in technology, communication, and transportation, make factors such as 
physical, geographical locations, less of a significant determining factor as to why other 
                                                           
25 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Society, (New 
York: W. W. Norton): 1999.  
 
26 David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich 
and Some So Poor, (New York: W. W. Norton): 1999. 
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countries attract more FDI than others.  Many arguments could be put forth as to why 
Singapore has attracted more FDI than Sierra Leone. I have argued in this paper that the 
difficulty of doing business in Sierra Leone is the most reasonable explanation as to why 
Sierra Leone attracts less FDI than Singapore.      
 
Conclusion and Implications 
The World Bank estimated the informal sector represented about 60% to 80% of 
Sierra Leone’s economy.27 Other terms used to refer to the informal economy include the 
shadow economy, the underground economy, and off-the-books economy. When a 
country such as Sierra Leone is predominately an informal economy, foreign companies 
are at a disadvantage because of the unfair competition they face with local companies 
who operate underground and who do not comply with most of the legal obligations 
required to operate a business in the formal sector. These informal competitors are 
damaging to foreign companies because local firms will enjoy cost advantage as a result 
of not paying taxes, not going through the court system, and ignoring many or all 
business regulations.  Such practices make the country less attractive to MNCs who will 
not be able to ignore business regulations and operate in a shadow economy.   A lengthy 
business registration process, cumbersome contract enforcement process forces local 
companies under the shadow economy.  Addressing these issues will bring most 
companies out of the shadow and encourage fair competition and will attract FDI.  
Singapore has attracted more FDI than Sierra Leone because it has created a 
business environment within a more formal economy that encourages fair competition 
                                                           
27 UNCTAD. “Investment Policy Review: Sierra Leone.” New York: United  
Nations, 2010. 
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and wherein it is easy to start and operate a business. The process of registering a 
business, obtaining a construction permit, buying and registering property, getting credit, 
paying taxes, trading across borders, and enforcing contracts are much more streamlined 
and formalized in Singapore than Sierra Leone. The procedures and the time it takes to 
start and operate a business in Singapore are much more favorable than in Sierra Leone.  
A favorable time period in which to start and operate a business is helpful in attracting 
foreign investors who are looking for business environments that are efficient, and in 
which transactions are protected, contracts are enforceable, and business and individual 
credit worthiness are determinable and verifiable. It is important that these issues are 
addressed by the government of Sierra Leone as they have been shown to influence 
where investors decide to invest.   
Sierra Leone needs to create an environment that attracts investors both locally 
and globally. The absence of a credit bureau in Sierra Lone is especially troubling and 
need to be addressed by the government. Credit bureaus are very important because they 
gather and maintain the credit history of individuals, businesses and investors. This 
information is needed for a smooth functioning of the financial system in a country 
because both banks and businesses use this information to extend credit to customers and 
businesses. The nonexistence of credit bureaus and credit scoring in Sierra Leone makes 
the efficient allocation of resources by investors and business difficult because of the 
unknown risk out there.  
Sierra Leone needs to strengthen and streamline the enforcement of contracts. 
Various studies have shown that efficient and speedy contract enforcement by the court 
system has many benefits for local and international business.  An efficient and speedy 
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contract enforcement system in a country’s court system encourages new business 
formation and business-to-business relationship because businesses are guaranteed 
protection by the law.   For example, a study by Mehnaz, Safavian, and Siddharth Sharma 
in 2007 found that businesses in countries with inefficient and slow contract enforcement 
systems tend to receive low financing from banks.28  Another study shows that countries 
with an efficient and speedy contract enforcement court system and with a good debt 
collection process tend to produce and export more goods than those that do not.29 In fact, 
in their research, John S. Ahlquist and Aseem Prakash, reveal that countries where 
contract enforcement is effective tend to attract more foreign direct investment than those 
whose contract enforcement system is lacking.30 If investors believe that courts are not an 
attractive avenue for resolving contract dispute, then investors will not be motivated to 
invest in that country. 
There are certain institutions needed for an economy to operate efficiently. 
Institutions and/or gate keepers, such as credit rating agencies, income tax system, 
accounting bodies, analyst, and a robust legal system, should be present and functioning 
properly. Such institutions will enforce contracts, settle disputes, recover debts, and 
sometimes act as consulting organizations. Unfortunately, these institutions are not fully 
functioning in Sierra Leone.  The government of Sierra Leone needs to set up or 
encourage the establishment and maintenance of these institutions. Properly functioning 
                                                           
28 Mehnaz, Safavian, and Siddharth Sharma. “When Do Creditor Rights Work?” 
Journal of Comparative Economics 35, no. 3 (2007): 484–508. 
 
29 Nathan, Nunn. “Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern 
of Trade.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 2 (2007): 569–600. 
 
30  John S. Ahlquist and Aseem Prakash. “FDI and the Costs of Contract  
Enforcement in Developing Countries,” Policy Sciences 43, no. 2 (2010): 181–200.  
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business environment institutions will not only attract FDI but will also improve the 
standard of living of its citizens. Sierra Leone should focus on building and or 
maintaining these institutions for a business friendly business environment.  
This research focuses primarily on direct foreign investment in Sierra Leone. 
Direct foreign investments differ substantially from indirect investments such as portfolio 
investments, wherein overseas institutions invest in equities listed on a nations’ stock 
market. Even though FDI became popular in the 1980s, most of the research is limited to 
the period between 2003 and 2013 because getting good data going back to 1980s is 
difficult.   
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Appendices 
Definition of Terms 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT): This is an agreement establishing the terms and 
conditions for private investment by nationals and companies of one state in another 
state. This type of investment is sometimes called foreign direct investment (FDI). BITs 
are established through trade pacts. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): An investment made by a company based in one 
country, into a company based in another country. Companies making direct investments 
typically have a significant degree of influence and control over the company into which 
the investment is made.  The investing company may make its overseas investment in a 
number of ways either by setting up a subsidiary or associate company in the foreign 
country; by acquiring shares of an overseas company, or through a merger or joint 
venture.  The accepted threshold for a foreign direct investment relationship, as defined 
by the OECD, is 10%. That is, the foreign investor must own at least 10% or more of the 
voting stock or ordinary shares of the investee company.  
 
IMF conditionality: The requirements placed on the usage or distribution of money lent 
to another country. Conditionality is most often associated with aid money. International 
organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, or 
individual countries can use conditionality when lending money to another country. The 
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donor country requires that the country receiving the funds adhere to certain rules 
directing the use of funds. 
 
Infant Industry Theory: The belief that emerging domestic industries need protection 
against international competition until they become mature and stable. Infant-industry 
theorists argue that industries in developing sectors of the economy need to be protected 
to keep international competitors from damaging or destroying the domestic infant 
industry. 
 
Informal Economy: This refers to part of economic activities that are not taxed, 
registered, regulated by the government, or included in the Gross National Product 
(GNP). Most activities in the informal economy lack licenses and good bookkeeping.  
Other terms used to describe the informal economy include black market, shadow 
economy, the underground economy, and “off the book” activities.  
 
Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI): An economic theory employed by developing 
or emerging market nations that wish to increase their self-sufficiency and decrease their 
dependency on developed countries. Implementation of the theory focuses on protection 
and incubation of domestic infant industries so they may emerge to compete with 
imported goods and make the local economy more self-sufficient. ISI seeks to protect 
local industries through various avenues such as tariffs, import quotas and subsidized 
government loans.  
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Lesser-Developed Country (LDC): A country that is considered lacking in terms of its 
economy, infrastructure, and industrial base. The population of a lesser-developed 
country often has a relatively low standard of living, due to low incomes and abundant 
poverty.  
 
Multinational Corporation (MNC): A corporation that has its facilities and other assets in 
at least one country other than its home country. Such companies have offices and/or 
factories in different countries and usually have a centralized head office where they 
coordinate global management. Very large multinationals have budgets that exceed those 
of many small countries. 
 
Regime Type: A political regime is a set of political structures that make up a state. 
Regime types include direct democracies, military dictatorship, civilian dictatorship, 
monarchic, democracy in transition, etc. Many believe that the type of regime has an 
effect on what type of investors a country can attract. 
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Millions of S$
 Country / Region 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
 Total 276,819.2 323,821.1 370,494.7 466,567.4 510,585.2 574,703.6 625,780.4 677,772.5 755,974.3 853,339.5
Asia 62,252.9 78,253.9 82,485.0 105,294.1 120,240.3 145,894.9 152,854.0 163,440.5 186,203.7 212,031.8
          Brunei Darussalam 357.9 380.7 309.1 283.7 297.0 317.9 292.5 336.2 367.6 400.6
Cambodia 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.5 1.5 0.9 6.9 22.8 22.6 23.8
China 359.7 910.0 1,689.5 2,314.1 4,423.7 9,725.7 14,028.7 13,612.1 14,669.7 16,491.7
Hong Kong 3,196.8 4,701.5 6,317.5 6,887.3 11,939.1 18,145.8 19,066.1 23,468.1 29,053.2 34,602.6
India 481.0 1,303.1 2,577.6 13,025.7 16,861.4 21,954.8 24,515.8 23,204.5 23,487.6 24,415.4
Indonesia 1,091.2 683.7 1,015.0 1,976.9 2,962.4 3,894.0 1,482.8 819.4 2,461.9 3,173.8
Israel 4,633.4 4,982.7 4,656.3 5,124.9 5,060.8 4,992.5 4,710.9 4,747.4 4,534.1 4,749.8
Japan 37,502.0 44,812.5 44,970.5 47,540.2 50,446.1 50,515.4 53,577.4 53,722.1 58,701.7 71,992.0
Korea, Republic of 846.7 1,267.5 780.6 3,040.2 3,250.5 2,906.3 3,062.1 4,143.5 3,566.8 4,960.2
Lao People's Democratic Republic - - - 2.0 1.6 5.7 2.5 3.8 3.7 4.1
Malaysia 5,032.7 8,159.4 8,412.4 11,378.0 12,585.3 15,864.9 14,437.6 19,867.9 27,684.5 27,302.0
Myanmar 7.6 14.8 17.6 94.0 94.7 18.9 45.0 19.4 4.0 -1.8
Philippines 707.6 739.8 871.1 984.5 1,101.0 1,080.3 1,353.1 2,018.6 1,974.6 2,271.5
Taiwan 5,730.8 7,211.2 7,541.3 7,703.7 6,553.2 6,169.4 5,772.1 7,195.4 7,265.7 8,218.2
Thailand 1,035.1 1,369.4 1,479.7 1,527.5 1,814.3 2,076.0 5,357.9 4,165.0 3,808.4 3,972.7
Vietnam 32.7 21.1 11.5 26.1 28.9 28.2 59.6 60.6 24.2 107.8
Europe 120,505.7 139,987.4 174,058.3 198,339.7 203,850.7 221,807.3 230,861.9 257,368.8 265,600.8 296,733.4
Denmark 1,083.8 1,790.9 1,920.4 2,187.1 3,101.5 3,905.0 8,241.7 8,973.9 10,027.5 9,802.0
France 6,349.7 7,003.7 8,090.6 10,961.0 9,507.2 8,103.7 8,064.9 10,609.2 12,574.3 12,244.5
Germany 7,278.5 8,189.2 7,591.6 9,226.9 11,227.0 11,136.4 13,947.0 14,215.9 14,754.4 15,270.6
Ireland 2,557.6 3,814.4 1,987.0 3,557.8 3,286.1 3,092.1 5,055.2 7,131.5 7,897.9 6,762.0
Luxembourg 2,269.9 2,909.2 4,964.1 5,593.1 8,054.1 18,142.3 19,968.3 23,797.5 21,256.5 22,807.9
Netherlands 31,560.8 32,142.1 48,631.0 51,418.6 61,001.4 61,511.7 60,546.5 69,372.9 75,371.3 84,350.9
Norway 6,217.2 8,565.6 15,216.6 17,079.5 21,267.0 23,134.0 22,075.9 21,632.5 20,489.4 20,765.5
Switzerland 16,444.3 22,273.1 27,113.7 27,453.4 23,504.9 26,851.5 27,166.3 28,566.7 32,587.8 40,220.8
United Kingdom 43,924.4 49,593.0 55,263.7 62,527.3 47,569.0 49,499.4 48,947.3 55,654.0 48,865.3 58,545.7
North America 43,855.6 43,163.1 41,061.4 54,676.8 55,780.2 61,850.8 70,499.5 79,095.2 109,806.8 120,782.2
United States 41,019.5 40,574.4 38,325.0 51,550.8 52,758.1 58,968.8 67,082.0 74,648.5 104,636.0 114,191.3
Canada 2,836.1 2,588.7 2,736.4 3,126.0 3,022.1 2,882.1 3,417.5 4,446.7 5,170.8 6,590.9
Oceania 3,255.1 4,836.4 5,574.0 7,279.9 8,235.1 9,523.2 11,446.6 13,761.2 15,436.2 16,547.1
Australia 2,674.3 2,846.9 3,318.7 4,615.2 4,572.7 6,004.3 7,145.5 9,197.5 9,922.4 10,028.2
New Zealand 132.7 1,482.0 1,704.7 1,618.8 1,902.6 2,109.6 2,503.4 3,081.5 3,472.6 3,621.2
South and Central America
and the Caribbean 41,672.7 50,141.6 60,876.4 91,009.7 109,156.4 122,052.1 144,716.5 149,625.8 162,173.9 189,085.9
Bahamas 10,935.2 10,420.3 13,476.3 14,232.6 14,908.9 18,472.2 20,550.6 20,823.2 19,589.4 20,876.2
Bermuda 5,095.1 11,260.6 13,126.8 20,655.2 22,884.4 24,305.1 25,327.4 20,180.9 30,806.7 33,030.2
British Virgin Islands 13,597.6 17,599.1 19,049.1 29,566.8 38,754.3 39,677.5 50,116.1 55,891.9 60,369.9 74,259.6
Cayman Islands 7,971.2 8,563.4 13,162.4 23,644.6 29,416.8 36,488.0 44,520.3 47,629.6 46,830.1 55,332.7
Africa 5,267.0 7,494.0 6,102.9 9,022.9 12,325.2 12,754.2 15,396.4 14,338.1 16,297.9 17,494.4
Mauritius 2,126.1 3,647.6 4,548.5 7,298.5 10,500.7 10,690.2 13,061.4 12,682.7 14,532.6 15,906.2
ASEAN 8,265.7 11,369.9 12,116.9 16,274.2 18,886.6 23,286.8 23,037.9 27,313.7 36,351.5 37,254.5
European Union (EU-28) 97,724.3 108,952.9 131,406.8 152,288.9 153,400.4 166,582.8 175,696.4 198,874.3 202,910.4 222,351.7
Surce:  Singapore Department of Statistics
Table 1.    FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN SINGAPORE BY COUNTRY / REGION, 2004-2013
(Stock as at Year-End)
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in US $ 
Year Singapore  Sierra Leone 
2000                         16,484,457,326                               39,000,825  
2001                         15,086,711,251                                 9,835,742  
2002                            6,401,974,025                               10,413,409  
2003                         11,941,337,976                                 8,615,050  
2004                         21,026,034,944                               61,153,314  
2005                         18,090,329,984                               90,731,670  
2006                         36,923,890,241                               58,869,144  
2007                         47,733,209,770                               95,470,171  
2008                         12,200,705,252                               53,095,074  
2009                         23,821,209,700                            110,430,203  
2010                         55,075,864,345                            238,404,158  
2011                         50,367,876,463                            950,477,689  
2012                         61,159,602,602                            548,073,515  
 
Source: World Bank FDI Report 2014 
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